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I
It is a convention of the public dialogue today that Watergate
and attendant scandals have created a crisis of public confidence in
the moral integrity of lawyers. Probably this is so. But why should
Watergate have had such an effect? Many lawyers did honor to
themselves as the affair unfolded, and its eventual outcome revealed
the powers of self-correction latent in American legal institutions.
More to the point,, Watergate was not the American public's first
introduction to the duplicities of lawyers; these are among the oldest
themes of American humor and folk wisdom. Watergate has a cer-
tain uniqueness, of course, because in this affair lawyers at the very
top of the federal government engaged in forms of misconduct not
merely crude and careless of the law but hostile to the fundamental
spirit of constitutional processes. But it can hardly be said that
Watergate revealed facts of life about the legal profession of which
either lawyers or the American public had been unaware.
Why, then, its shock effect? The reason, I suspect, lies not in
the new knowledge Watergate brought but in the old knowledge it
made impossible any longer to suppress from consciousness. Water-
gate brought to the surface a condition of ethical malaise and confu-
sion within the legal profession of such long standing that it can well
be called chronic-a condition of which many have been cognizant,
and not least the leaders of the legal profession itself. Doubts about
the ethics of lawyers, indeed, have gone far deeper than doubts that
individual practitioners live up to the rules which the legal profes-
sion has accepted as guides for professional conduct. The doubts
have focused on the very significance, the practicality, the meaning
and coherence of these rules, and, indeed, of any rules that might
be substituted in their place.
The history of the adoption of codes of legal ethics in the United
t Old Dominion Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs, Columbia University School
of Law.
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States suggests the caution with which lawyers have approached the
business of formulating such rules.' In 1854 Judge George Shars-
wood published a series of lectures for lawyers under the title An
Essay on Professional Ethics.2 In 1887, thirty-three years later, the
Alabama State Bar Association officially adopted a Code of Ethics
based in part on Judge Sharswood's lectures.3 In 1908 the American
Bar Association, taking its lead from the Alabama Code, officially
adopted thirty-two Canons of Legal Ethics.4 Twenty years later, in
1928, 5 and then again in 19331 and in 1937, 7 special committees of
the A.B.A. ventured the opinion that these Canons needed revision.
Seventeen years later, in 1954, a committee created by the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation at the request of the A.B.A. reiterated that
judgment.8 But it was not until 1964 that the A.B.A., at the request
of its President, Lewis Powell, created the Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards, which carried the task of revision
through to completion and recommended a new Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility? That Code became effective for A.B.A. mem-
bers in 1970 and has now been substantially adopted by forty-nine
state bar associations. 0
This is not a record of unseemly haste. It might be said that the
legal profession has regarded questions of ethics as among the great
eternal questions of mankind, and, because eternal, postponable. In
this regard lawyers have not been different from the members of
other professions like medicine and scholarship. For example, when
the American Association of University Professors was established
in 1915, it created two standing committees-Committee A on
academic freedom and Committee B on professional ethics and
responsibilities. Committee A has been meeting and working hard
ever since. Committee B did not meet for a period of thirty-five
years ending in 1956. Why this reluctance of the professions to deal
formally with problems of professional ethics? Is it simply the desire
to enjoy professional privileges and ignore professional responsibili-
See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953).
G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1884).
Code of Ethics, 118 Ala. xxiii-xxxiv (1899), reprinted in H. DRINKER, supra note 1, at
352.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
Preface, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
SId.
7Id.
79 ABA Rep. 507 (1954).
94 ABA Rep. 728 (1969).
" California has not adopted the Code. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1975).
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ties? Perhaps, but I suspect there is more. The cause lies not only
in bad will but in puzzled intelligence. For there are difficult ques-
tions which haunt any effort to frame an ethical code. Is an ethical
code something which is better left informal and unwritten? Are the
problems that professionals encounter too subtle for fixed rules?
Can such rules be formulated if there is no agreement on the basic
functions of the profession? Can there be such agreement if the
members of the profession disagree, as they have a right to do, on
underlying political, social and philosophic issues? It is with ques-
tions like these that the formulators of a code of professional ethics
must ultimately grapple, and it is not surprising that they have
repeatedly found their task more formidable than they had ex-
pected.
This, certainly, is what the Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards, which produced the new Code of Professional
Responsibility, discovered. It worked for five years before it reached
agreement, and it completed its task with a quite different concep-
tion of its mission than that with which it began. In the words of
its chairman:
A completely changed document was not envisioned by either
those who gave the Committee its task or the Committee mem-
bers themselves. . . .The initial efforts of the Committee were
directed toward reorganizing the concepts included in the
Canons. . . .The Committee encountered many doubts as to
what much of the language meant, which in turn led to de-
tailed analysis of what in fact the duties of a lawyer are and
should be. And so our original efforts merely to reorganize and
reword the Canons became an extended search for the full
meaning of professional responsibility in the context of
modern-day society, a search that culminated in the formula-
tion of the Code."
The new Code of Professional Responsibility was produced by a
committee that understood the magnitude and difficulty of the task
to which it had been assigned. It produced a Code that represents a
considerable improvement on the older Canons.
But has it succeeded in spelling out "the full meaning of profes-
sional responsibility in the context of modern-day society"?' 2 It is
" Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK.
L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1970).
,1 Preamble and Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1975).
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impossible in the scope of a brief article to review each of the specific
rules and recommendations which compose the Code of Professional
Responsibility. I propose instead to focus more broadly on the fun-
damental intellectual distinction on which the Code is based-the
distinction between "ethical considerations" and "disciplinary
rules"-and to scrutinize the adequacy of its rationale.
II
The most obvious difference between the new Code and the
older Canons of Legal Ethics is that the new Code has a tighter and
more logical structure. The thirty-two old Canons have been re-
duced to nine.' 3 These "are statements of axiomatic norms, express-
ing in general terms the standards of professional conduct expected
of lawyers in their relationship with the public, with the legal sys-
tem, and with the legal profession."' 4
The actual impact of these nine canons, however, is spelled out
in the "ethical considerations" and "disciplinary rules" which are
attached to each of them, and it is this apparatus of "considera-
tions" and "rules" which represents the significant departure in the
Code's mode of attack on the problems of legal ethics. The "ethical
considerations" are described as "aspirational in character."' They
express "objectives" towards which every lawyer should strive, and
enunciate principles by which he should be guided when he has
moral choices to make. In contrast, the "disciplinary rules" are
mandatory. They state "the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."'"
As Lon Fuller' 7 and Samuel Stumpf'8 have argued, this distinc-
tion between standards of excellence and standards of minimal per-
formance is in many contexts an indispensable one. Among the
values which society has an interest in promoting are some which
,3 As the Special Committee's Reporter, Professor John F. Sutton, has said, these Canons
might have been set at eight, for Canon 3 ("A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing the
Unauthorized Practice of Law") is for practical purposes only the converse of Canon 1 ("A
Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession")
and of Canon 2 ("A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available"). Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 255, 259 (1970).
11 Preamble and Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1975).
,s Id. at 1.
as Id.
17 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964) (distinguishing between the morality of duty
and morality of aspiration).
" S. STUMPF, MORALITY AND THE LAW (1966) (distinguishing between "legal order" and
"moral order").
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cannot be made the objects of direct command. To order people to
be heroes, for example, or to command them to be charitable or
forgiving or dispassionate, is to impose obligations which most peo-
ple cannot realistically be expected to meet and which can expose
them, if a serious effort to enforce such norms is undertaken, to
punishing surveillance and tyranny. The law, in concert with other
social institutions like the family, school, and church, can provide
assistance and encouragement to such values, for example, by giv-
ing tax incentives favoring charity. But it can attach direct sanc-
tions to them only at excessive cost. They must be seen as "aspira-
tions," not legal duties. The new Code of Professional Responsibility
is based on the belief that a similar distinction between aspirations
and minimal duties is useful for the governance of the legal profes-
sion itself.
By using this distinction the new Code has made many useful
emendations in those rules affecting some of the more technical
aspects of legal practice. Two examples must bear the burden of
many that could be offered. The older Canons stated that a lawyer
should not ask to be excused from counseling an indigent client "for
any trivial reason."' 9 The new Code states that a lawyer should not
ask to be excused "except for compelling reasons."2 Again, with
regard to the question whether a lawyer should testify as a witness
for his client, the older Canons held that a lawyer should avoid
doing so except when "essential to the ends of Justice."' 2' In con-
trast, the new Code, after reviewing the relevant issues, concludes
that "doubts should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and
against his continuing or becoming an advocate. ' 22 In each case, the
new Code proposes a somewhat higher standard.
But is it true that, as the chairman of the Special Committee
that produced the new Code has said, such changes introduce a
"more stringent" test of professional conduct?23 These higher stan-
dards are placed among the "ethical considerations." They ask for
a greater spirit of selflessness from the lawyer; but they do not
demand it. The new Code in this way avoids a pitfall into which
many ethical codes fall. Even the best intentioned of such codes,
perhaps especially the best intentioned, often promote moral cyni-
cism by failing to make clear whether they are pointing to ideal
"1 Canon 4, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
20 Ethical Consideration 2-29, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
21 Canon 19, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
2 Ethical Consideration 5-10, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
21 Wright, supra note 11, at 13.
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behavior or to minimally acceptable rules of conduct. If I correctly
divine their thinking, the authors of the new Code elected to try to
lift lawyers' sights while avoiding the excesses of rigid "dos" and
"don'ts," and this was a reasonable course to pursue. But if "more
stringent" means raising minimal enforceable standards, the new
Code is not generally more stringent than the older Canons. Further,
the distinction between "ethical considerations" and "disciplinary
rules" contains a number of puzzles not susceptible to resolution in
terms of the difference between a morality of aspiration and a mo-
rality of minimal duty.
Ethical Consideration 2-21, for example, states, "A lawyer
should not accept compensation or any thing of value incident to his
employment or services from one other than his client without the
knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure." Why is
this only an "aspiration" and not a mandatory rule? As a layman I
cannot imagine any but the most highly exceptional circumstances
which would excuse departure from it. Again, Ethical Consideration
4-5 states, "A lawyer should not use information acquired in the
course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the
client. . . ." Admitting that the term "disadvantage" is subject to
variable interpretations in concrete cases, I fail to see why this ex-
presses only an objective towards which lawyers should strive. It
seems to me to be the statement of a minimal condition without
which the trust between lawyer and client would dissolve.
Is it possible that in placing such rules in the more permissive
category of "ethical considerations" the authors of the Code had in
mind not a distinction between a morality of aspiration and a mo-
rality of duty but something rather different-a distinction between
an ethic of broad guidelines as against an ethic of rigid imperatives?
In making their distinction between "ethical considerations" and
"disciplinary rules," the authors of the Code have touched upon the
classic jurisprudential problem of determining the proper line be-
tween "law" and "morality." On what basis do we distinguish be-
tween those areas of human conduct fit for regulation by an appara-
tus of determinate rules and punitive sanctions and those areas
which should be regulated by less rigid and more informal methods?
This large issue is buried, unless I am mistaken, in the Code's dis-
tinction between "ethical considerations" and "disciplinary rules."
There are at least three reasons for distinguishing between
"law" and "morals." One is the reason the Code makes explicit:
some values can only be projected as "aspirational." We cannot, for
example, look to the comparatively precise rules and attached sanc-
tions of the law to enforce such standards of high morality as "Love
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thy neighbor" without risking excessive regimentation and inva-
sions of individual autonomy. If we distinguish between "law" and
"morality" on this basis, we look to the law-or, within a profes-
sional code, to "disciplinary rules"-only to enforce minimal obliga-
tions. As regards the "aspirational," the law-or a professional code
-can try to give encouragement, but no more.
A second and independent distinction is also often embedded
in the comparison between "law" and "morality." There are
domains of conduct-e.g., the use of violence-with regard to which
it is relatively easy to formulate rules free from undue vagueness
and to expect that there will be few conditions excusing departures
from them. At the other extreme, there are domains of conduct-
e.g., relations between friends, between parents and children, be-
tween professional colleagues-where circumstances vary widely,
where qualities like affection, integrity, imagination, sympathy,
and judgment are the primary desiderata, and where hard-and-
fast rules are likely to be encumbrances. To distinguish between
"law" and "morals," or between "disciplinary rules" and "ethical
considerations," with this contrast in mind carries implications
different from a distinction resting on the contrast between ideal
aspirations and minimally decent conduct. It is not because "ethical
considerations" aim higher than "disciplinary rules," but because
they deal with questions less easily codified, that they are to be
treated as different. Lawyers face many issues of a subtle or highly
exceptional character which call not for simple "dos" and "don'ts,"
but for an enlarged and more sensitive consciousness of the variety
of values at stake.
The decision of the authors of the Code to place many rules that
might otherwise seem minimal in the more fluid category of "ethical
considerations" can be explained, I believe, only on these grounds.
But the failure of the Code to articulate its rationale here leads to a
generic ambiguity, for the distinction between rules that are more
fluid and rules that are less so is not a categorical one; even more
than the distinction between aspirations and minimal obligations,
it is a matter of degree. The point at which we draw the line between
an informal and hortatory "morality" on the one side and a system
of formal rules and coercive sanctions on the other depends on a
pragmatic judgment as to where the weight of the unforeseen and
the exceptional is likely to be so heavy as to make formal rules
inefficacious. All rules, not only moral rules, have a penumbra of
indeterminacy around them. To take the standard illustration, does
an ordinance prohibiting vehicles in a public park apply to baby
carriages? Further, there are always excusing conditions in which it
[43:874
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is patently unfair to apply a given rule, and the list of these excusing
conditions cannot be fully set out in advance.
Yet just as these considerations do not justify turning homicide
laws or speeding laws into mere statements of aspiration, they do
not adequately rationalize in all instances the merely "aspirational"
character ascribed to the Code's ethical considerations. Ethical
Consideration 7-16, for example, states that when a lawyer appears
before a legislative body, either in connection with legislation or in
an investigatory or impeachment proceeding, "he should identify
himself and his client, if identity of his client is not privileged."
Ethical Consideration 4-6 states that "a lawyer should not attempt
to sell a law practice as a going business because, among other
reasons, to do so would involve the disclosure of confidences and
secrets." I presume that such rules are not made "disciplinary
rules" because exceptions and excuses can be imagined which limit
their applicability. But if they were treated as disciplinary rules, it
would be possible over time to build up an analogue to case law
which would gradually fill out and make more precise the obliga-
tions they do and do not impose.
Why was this alternative not chosen? So far as I can guess, it
is because still a third reason for distinguishing between "law" and
"morality" is implicit in the Code. We sometimes distinguish be-
tween the two not on the ground either of the higher aspirations or
greater fluidity of "morality" but on the ground of its comparative
insusceptibility to reasonable or just modes of firm enforcement.
Accordingly, the sanctions we wish to use to enforce morality must
depend more on the hortatory and persuasive than on threats to life,
liberty, or property. The problem of censorship is an example. The
case against censorship can hardly be that it is unrealistic to try to
prohibit the publication of subversive or pornographic materials.
These have been suppressed fairly effectively in many societies. Nor
does the case rest only on the vagueness of the criteria defining the
subversive or the pornographic. If a lawmaker is willing to paint
with a big enough brush and doesn't particularly care about the
good that is sacrificed with the bad, he can be reasonably clear
about what he means to forbid. But the case against censorship lies
precisely in this tyranny of the big brush. To trust in censorship you
have to be blind or indifferent to the probable stupidities, malice,
and inflexibility with which the censorship laws will be enforced. In
brief, a major reason for leaving certain matters to moral suasion is
that we think they can be regulated by the blunt instruments of the
law only at great risk to liberty, fairness, and other values.
The formulators of the new Code of Professional Responsibility
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did not explicitly make this point. But they were influenced, I sus-
pect, by a feeling that the disciplinary procedures available to the
bar are not sufficiently trustworthy and do not possess the necessary
general credibility and legitimacy to bear a heavy burden of enforce-
ment duties. In consequence, they leaned hard on their category of
"ethical considerations." They may well have made the prudent
choice. The ideological and political differences in the nation at
large have grown more acute, and the currents of distrust affecting
all authority-laden institutions are considerable. The legal profes-
sion has not been, and cannot be, insulated from its larger environ-
ment. Under the circumstances, a decision to adopt only a mini-
mum baggage of "disciplinary rules" is intelligible.
Nevertheless, the logic of the decision needs to be spelled out.
To opt for exhortation as against definite sanctions requires a judg-
ment in which the harm done by potentially increased violation of
norms is weighed against the dangers implicit in close regulation
and the use of an organized enforcement machinery. And this judg-
ment depends, in turn, not only on an estimate of the probabilities
of given risks but on a judgment of the relative importance of the
social values involved in one alternative as against the other. It was
once considered better, for example, to bet on the good will of em-
ployers and the benefits of free individual enterprise than to bet on
closer regulation of the conditions of labor. The social judgment as
to the wisdom of this bet has changed. In relation to the behavior
of lawyers, the Code of Professional Responsibility makes its bet on
lawyers' judgment and good will. Is this bet the wise one? Many in
and out of the legal profession will disagree. If it is to be adequately
defended, the Code requires a general discussion of the function of
lawyers in society and of the relative weight to be ascribed to differ-
ent social values. In the absence of such a discussion, many of the
specific judgments made in the Code may seem, if not arbitrary, at
least suspect.
III
In 1934, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, in his address on The
Public Influence of the Bar, said that the legal profession's "canons
of ethics for the most part are generalizations designed for an earlier
era." The need, he said, was to "pass beyond the petty details of
form and manners which have been so largely the subject of our
Codes of Ethics, to more fundamental considerations of the way in
which our professional activities affect the welfare of society as a
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whole. ' 24 "The welfare of society as a whole" is a sweeping term.
Can a profession composed of people who hold radically different
political and moral outlooks come to an agreement about its mean-
ing? Probably not, if what is sought is an official doctrine to which
all must swear fealty. But the function of a professional code, as the
authors of the new Code recognized implicitly, is not to provide
practitioners with textbook maxims. It is to sensitize them to the
scope, depth and complexity of the commitments they have under-
taken in entering the profession.
The value of a code, therefore, lies less in its specific "oughts"
and "musts" than in its utility as a catalyst for a continuing dis-
course on the profession's raison d'etre. From this point of view the
most conspicuous shortcoming of the new Code is its lack of a cata-
lytic general discussion of the relation of the practice of law to "the
welfare of society as a whole." Its authors have quoted Justice
Stone's words approvingly, but they have not taken the cue. The
new Code, although it is more sensitive to moral dilemmas and more
ambitious in its expectations than the old Canons, is offered to the
legal profession and the public in a form detached from an explicit
consideration of the law's major functions in contemporary society
and of the general context in which ethical problems arise for mod-
ern lawyers. If there had been such a discussion, to what problems
might it have been addressed? I can merely suggest a few.
(1) Lawyers are professionals, and share with other profes-
sionals modes of conduct that clash with normal rules of everyday
morality. One of the reasons for the widely-held view that morality
is in a peculiar state of decline today and that a dangerous "relativ-
ism" has taken over is simply the proliferation in our society of
specialized professions, like the law, which have distinctive func-
tions and therefore distinctive ethical norms. What is seen as the
"decline" of ethics is in part the emergence of multiple ethical sys-
tems, attuned to the performance of tasks more intricate and imper-
sonal than those to which the great sweeping principles of tradi-
tional ethical codes apply. But when the specialized codes depart
too frequently and radically from commonplace notions of accepta-
ble behavior, demoralizing tensions are created within individuals
and in society at large. A consequence is a disposition to look upon
both professional and general moral codes with indifference or con-
tempt.
Is there a remedy? An essential element in any remedy, though
2, Quoted in Preface, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975).
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of course not a sufficient one, is a process of continuing philosophic
criticism and interpretation conducted within the legal profession
and between it and the outside world. The purpose of such a process,
on one side, would be to explain the legitimate differences that exist
between professional and popular codes, and, on the other, to cor-
rect professional or popular codes when the clash between them is
indefensible. What I describe, of course, is simply moral philosophy
in one of its classic forms-reflection on moral norms and the criti-
cal reconstruction of them to restore their coherence. The present
Code of Professional Responsibility, because it is not embedded in
an explicit examination of the issues raised by the differences be-
tween professional and general ethical codes, seems incomplete; and
it leaves untouched one major cause for the public distrust of law-
yers and for lawyers' distrust of themselves.
(2) Over and above the specialized roles played by members
of the professions, another circumstance also invites public suspi-
cion. In the United States the professions have been surrounded by
a democratic and egalitarian ethos. During the nineteenth century
many states in the Union refused to license doctors and lawyers. The
rationale was simple enough: by what right did lawyers or doctors
claim to know something that other people did not know? Was their
claim to special knowledge not simply a way of shutting off competi-
tion and exercising monopolistic control of the market? In fact,
when the American Medical Association was formed in 1847, it
adopted a code of ethics as part of its campaign for greater public
respect for trained physicians. 5
Much of the new Code for lawyers can be understood in a simi-
lar context. Of its nine canons, five are directly related to the de-
fense of the profession against competitors and detractors and to the
establishment of its claim to be accorded special rights and pow-
ers.2" Indeed, so much of the Code is devoted to matters of this sort
25 The medical profession in the United States was faced with a crisis in public confi-
dence in 1847. Medical regulations in most states had been repealed with the result that
uneducated practitioners and rank imposters had begun to compete with regular physi-
cians for patients. Exponents of the Code of Ethics hoped that the public would cooper-
ate with doctors in establishing standards for medical practice which would prevent the
worst abuses of the doctor-patient relationship and re-establish public respect for the
medical profession.
Konold, History of the Codes of Medical Ethics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS (to be pub-
lished in 1977) (copyright, Georgetown University).
2' Canon 1: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of
the Legal Profession." Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling
Its Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available." Canon 3: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Preventing
the Unauthorized Practice of Law." Canon 8: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Improving the
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that a malicious critic might question whether the Code is not really
more concerned with the protection of a guild's privileges than with
the advancement of the public interest. The indictment, I believe,
is unjustified. But the indictment is invited because the Code says
little or nothing, except by implication, about two basic issues: one,
the special ways in which values like liberty and impartial justice
require distinctive institutions manned by people with distinctive
professional obligations; two, the dangers of converting this special
role into a kind of professional imperialism.
An overhanging problem for lawyers today is whether their
methods of dealing with human problems are invariably the appro-
priate ones. We have become a litigious society, attempting to settle
more and more of our problems in the courts, and using adversary
methods even in settings like universities where collegiality has tra-
ditionally been thought to be a primary desideratum. But surely it
is a professional conceit, if not a kind of magical thinking, to sup-
pose that all, or most, social problems can be compressed into the
forms of an adversary system in which there are only two sides, one
of which has to be right.27 What services can lawyers perform as
negotiators, arbitrators, bargainers, compromisers? What services
can they perform by stepping aside and allowing the better informed
to make the fundamental decisions? For example, why is fault in
malpractice decided by judges and juries, and not by doctors? Be-
yond this, do lawyers have an obligation to explore more systemati-
cally the social problems that might better be solved by leaving
them to the political process? Further, what materials and questions
ought to be introduced into law schools to sensitize future lawyers
to the limits as well as the strengths of the law as a system of social
control? So long as such issues are not conspicuous in the legal
profession's examination of itself, its ethical preoccupations are
Legal System." Canon 9: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety."
2' [Tihere are two related characteristics of the law that contribute to making its
output of "justice" unpalatable. One is the fact that the legal system tends to have
written into it the assumption that in any dispute one side is right and the other side is
wrong. The adversary system is built on this assumption and helps to reinforce it: and
the court is ordinarily empowered only to decide a winner and a loser-not to find a way
to help the loser adjust to his loss, or to avoid in the future the action that led to his
loss, or to alter the conditions that led to the loser's behaving as he did.
The second difficulty is related to this. An assumption implicit in the operation of
the law is that once rights and obligations have been authoritatively stated, individuals
have only one mode of adaptation available to them: acceptance. The assumption, in
other words, is that learning is the only response to a deprivation.
Bredemeier, Law as an Integrative Mechanism, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 73, 85-86 (W. Evan
ed. 1962) (emphasis in original).
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likely to seem distorted and somewhat provincial.
(3) Systematic examination is needed as well of the implica-
tions for legal ethics of the greatly altered setting in which lawyers
now practice their profession. The preoccupations of the old Canons
still lie heavy in the new Code, and they are the preoccupations of
a profession composed overwhelmingly of individual practitioners
serving individual clients. Only about a third of all lawyers today,
however, are individual practitioners; about twenty-five percent
work for government or for private corporations; and the remainder,
for the most part, practice law in collective settings, working for
large firms and serving clients who are not individuals but legally
created entities." What are the responsibilities of individuals in
such settings? What are the ethical issues, for example, when law-
yers serve not as counselors to a corporation but as involved partici-
pants in its daily activities? What view of their responsibilities
should lawyers hold, to take another example, when more and more
of their work is devoted not to guiding individuals through a net-
work of essentially settled rules but to changing the law to fit their
client's or employing organization's needs?29 These are the kinds of
issues, I suspect, that bear heavily on the consciences of young
lawyers today and lead to their disaffection from their chosen pro-
fession. The obligations of the lawyer have become elusive in an
environment in which rules from a simpler time still dominate ethi-
cal reflection.
This is a mere checklist of important problems, and an incom-
plete one, but it will suggest what I venture to think is a necessary
supplement to the promulgation of a detailed Code. It is the emer-
gence of a body of critical discourse on basic problems affecting the
sense of purpose of the legal profession. The Code of Professional
Responsibility is a useful point of departure for such a discussion,
but its principal potential utility will be lost if the discussion re-
mains at the starting line it has defined. For in the legal profession,
as in most other domains of life, the elevation of standards comes
in the main from neither exhortation nor codification. It comes from
renewed attention to first principles, from a freshened awareness of
the changed problems people confront, and from a sustained debate
about the best ways to deal with them.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 10-12 (1972).
- See Hazard, Rethinking Legal Ethics, 26 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1974).
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